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Abstract
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investigated. The main distinction in the de¯nitions consists of the
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household and valuation equilibria prove equivalent in the absence of
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The aim of this inquiry is to clarify the relationship between the general equi-
librium model with multi-member households developed in Haller (2000) and
Gersbach and Haller (2001, 2003, 2005) and club models with multiple pri-
vate goods.1 The traditional general equilibrium model of a pure exchange
economy has treated households as if they were single consumers. The dis-
tinction between a household and its members potentially leads to inquiries
into household decisions, household formation, household stability, the in-
teraction between the competitive market allocation of private goods and
household formation | and to a host of related modeling issues. Household
decisions have been widely studied in the empirically oriented literature. Of
particular interest for our purposes is the contribution of Chiappori (1988,
1992) who introduced a model of collective rationality (e±cient consump-
tion decisions) of multi-member households. Household formation or, more
generally, group formation is the main subject of the literature on matching,
assignment games, and hedonic coalitions.
One would expect that the prevailing household structure, that is, the parti-
tion of the population into households, and the decision criteria of households
a®ect the allocation of resources among consumers. Conversely, economic
considerations are likely to in°uence decisions to form or dissolve households.
Therefore, we aim to develop a formal framework that integrates three alloca-
tion mechanisms operating at di®erent levels of aggregation. First, individual
decisions are made to join or leave households. Second, collective decisions
within households determine the consumption plans of household members.
Third, competitive exchange across households yields a feasible allocation of
resources. By and large, the literature on matching, assignment games, and
hedonic coalitions has not achieved this integration.2 It assumes at most
1See in particular Cole and Prescott (1997), Ellickson (1979), Ellickson, Grodal, Scotch-
mer, and Zame (1999, 2001), Gilles and Scotchmer (1997, 1998), Wooders (1988, 1989,
1997).
2A noteworthy exception are Drµ eze and Greenberg (1980) who combine the concepts
of individual stability and price equilibrium, but con¯ne the analysis of their most com-
2one private good. Thus, it has no use for competitive commodity markets
and cannot investigate the interaction between household formation and the
competitive market allocation of private goods.
In Haller (2000) and Gersbach and Haller (2001) we take a ¯rst step and
incorporate the collective rationality concept of Chiappori (1988, 1992) into
a general equilibrium framework. This setting has allowed us to study the in-
teraction between two of the three allocation mechanisms: collective decisions
and competitive markets. Haller (2000) assumes an exogenously given house-
hold structure. Every household member consumes an individual bundle of
private goods and has individual preferences. Preferences permit positive
or negative intra-household externalities: Individual welfare can be a®ected
by own consumption and the consumption of fellow household members.
Gersbach and Haller (2001) introduce a variable household structure, with
household speci¯c preferences: An individual cares about who belongs to
her household and who consumes what in her household. Hence, in general,
there can be group externalities (related to household composition) as well
as consumption externalities (related to household consumption). An alloca-
tion consists of two parts, an allocation of commodities to consumers and an
allocation of people into households. In Gersbach and Haller (2003) we take
further steps towards an endogenous household structure by amending the
equilibrium conditions with stability requirements known from the matching
literature.
Henceforth, we shall use \household model" as generic term for the kind of
models developed and analyzed in Gersbach and Haller (2003) and use \club
model" as generic term for a sophisticated club model which also allows for
endogenous group formation and competitive market allocation of (multiple)
private goods. For the sake of direct comparison, we rule out multiple club
memberships, club goods and abstract club projects, features which could
be incorporated in a re¯ned household model. Then the distinguishing fea-
ture of the club model is that individuals shop for both club memberships
and private consumption. This means that club memberships are priced
prehensive model to an instructive example.
3via admission fees or valuations. Each person makes optimal choices, given
her individual budget constraint. In equilibrium, prices are such that mar-
kets for memberships and markets for commodities clear. In the household
model, actual households make collective consumption decisions for their
members, subject to a household budget constraint. In equilibrium, nobody
wants to exercise an outside option (like becoming single) at the prevailing
market prices and commodity markets clear. In both models, the outcome
is an allocation of commodities to individual consumers and a partition of
the population into clubs or households. The two models can be considered
equivalent if they yield the same equilibrium outcomes.
A priori, the only di®erence between the two models lies in the equilib-
rium concepts. We are going to show that in essence, the two models are
equivalent in the absence of consumption externalities. To be precise, the
most stringent equilibrium concept for the household model, a competitive
equilibrium where no group of consumers can bene¯t from forming a new
household, and the standard equilibrium concept for club models, valuation
equilibrium, coincide in the absence of consumption externalities. Moreover,
the equilibrium outcomes belong to the strong core, which is a rather general
property of valuation equilibria. We further show by means of an example
that the equivalence breaks down in the presence of consumption external-
ities. In the example, a valuation equilibrium allocation which is weakly
Pareto-optimal does not exist. However, there exists a competitive equilib-
rium where no group of consumers can bene¯t from forming a new household
and the equilibrium allocation constitutes a strong Pareto-optimum. Finally,
we demonstrate that this allocation can be sustained as valuation equilibrium
outcome if club contracts can stipulate restrictions on private consumption
of club members.
2 The Basic Model
Here we present the primitive data underlying both the household model and
the club model. We consider a ¯nite pure exchange economy with variable
4household structure. There is a ¯nite and non-empty set of individuals or
consumers, I. A (potential) household is any non-empty subset h of the pop-
ulation I. H = fh µ Ijh 6= ;g denotes the set of all potential households. For
i 2 I, Hi = fh µ Iji 2 hg denotes the set of all potential households which
have i as a member. Variable household structure means that household
membership is an endogenous outcome. The households that actually form
give rise to a household structure P, that is, a partition of the population
I into non-empty subsets. If P is the prevailing household structure and
i 2 I is a consumer, then let P(i) denote the unique element of P (unique
household in P) to which i belongs.
Commodities. There exists a ¯nite number ` ¸ 1 of commodities. Thus
the commodity space is I R
`. Each commodity is formally treated as a pri-
vate good, possibly with externalities in consumption. Consumer i 2 I has
consumption set Xi = I R
`
+ so that the commodity allocation space is
X ´
Q
j2I Xj. Generic elements of X are denoted x = (xi), y = (yi). Com-
modities are denoted by superscripts k = 1;:::;`. For a potential household
h µ I, h 6= ;, set Xh =
Q
i2h Xi, the consumption set for household h. Xh
has generic elements xh = (xi)i2h. If x = (xi)i2I 2 X is a commodity alloca-
tion, then consumption for household h is the restriction of x = (xi)i2I to h,
xh = (xi)i2h.
Endowments. Every potential household h is endowed with a commodity
bundle !h > 0. For i 2 I and h = fig, we use the notation !i in lieu of !fig.
In general, the aggregate or social endowment depends on the prevailing
household structure P and equals !P =
P
h2P !h. The social endowment is
independent of the household structure if (and only if) the endowment of
each household equals the sum of the individual endowments of its members.
We call this condition individual property rights.
(IPR) Individual Property Rights: !h =
P
i2h !i for all h 2 H.
Note that if the social endowment is independent of the household structure,
then it equals !S =
P
i2I !i.
5Allocations. We de¯ne an allocation of the economy with variable house-
hold structure as a pair (x;P) where x 2 X is an allocation of commodities
and P is a household structure. The allocation is feasible if
P
i2I xi = !P.
Preferences. Preferences are household-speci¯c. This means that an indi-
vidual cares only about the composition of and the consumption in its own
household. Di®erent household members may exert di®erent externalities
upon others. To formally represent household-speci¯c preferences, let us
denote X ¤ =
S
h2H Xh and de¯ne Ai = f(xh;h) 2 X ¤£H : h 2 Hi;xh 2 Xhg
for i 2 I. We assume that each individual i 2 I has a utility representation
Ui : Ai ! I R. In the following, we are going to consider the special case of
(ACE) Absence of Consumption Externalities: Ui(xh;h) = Vi(xi;h)
for i 2 I;(xh;h) 2 Ai;xh = (xj)j2h.
In this case, individual i cares only about own consumption and household
composition. Still, preferences over one's own consumption may change with
household composition and, vice versa, preferences over household compo-
sition can depend on own consumption. In the separable case of the form
Ui(xh;h) = ui(xi)+vi(h), preferences over own consumption and preferences
over household composition are independent. If vi ´ 0, then the separable
case reduces to absence of externalities.
Social Welfare. A feasible allocation (x;P) is a weak core allocation,
if there do not exist a non-empty subset J of I, a partition Q of J into




h2Q !h and Uj(yQ(j);Q(j)) > Uj(xP(j);P(j)) for all j 2 J. A feasible
allocation (x;P) is weakly Pareto-optimal, if there is no feasible allocation
(y;Q) such that Ui(yQ(i);Q(i)) > Ui(xP(i);P(i)) for all i 2 I. The de¯nition
of strong core allocation and strong Pareto optimum, respectively,
rules out weak improvements by any coalition J or the grand coalition I,
respectively.
De¯ne a state of the economy as a triple (p;x;P) such that p 2 I R
` is a price
system and (x;P) 2 X £ P is an allocation, i.e. x = (xi)i2I is an allocation
6of commodities and P is an allocation of consumers (a household structure, a
partition of the population into households). We say that in state (p;x;P),
(a) consumer i can bene¯t from exit, if P(i) 6= fig and there exists
yi 2 Bfig(p) such that Ui(yi;fig) > Ui(xP(i);P(i));
(b) consumer i can bene¯t from joining another household g,
if g 2 P, g 6= P(i) and there exists yg[fig 2 Bg[fig(p) such that
Uj(yg[fig;g [ fig) > Uj(xP(j);P(j)) for all j 2 g [ fig;
(c) a group of consumers h can bene¯t from forming a new household,
if h 62 P and there exists yh 2 Bh(p) such that
Uj(yh;h) > Uj(xP(j);P(j)) for all j 2 h.
3 Competitive Equilibrium among Households
In order to introduce the equilibrium concept, we consider ¯rst a household
h 2 H and a price system p 2 I R
`. For xh = (xi)i2h 2 Xh; denote








the household's aggregate expenditure. Then h's budget set is de¯ned as
Bh(p) = fxh 2 Xh : p ¤ xh · p ¢ !hg:
We next de¯ne the e±cient budget set EBh(p) as the set of xh 2 Bh(p)
with the property that there is no yh 2 Bh(p) such that
Ui(yh;h) ¸ Ui(xh;h) for all i 2 h;
Ui(yh;h) > Ui(xh;h) for some i 2 h.
7The subsequent equilibrium condition 0, xh 2 EBh(p), constitutes the most
general form of collective rationality of households in the sense of Chiappori
(1988, 1992). For single households, it coincides with the standard condition
of utility or preference maximization.
De¯nition 1 A state (p;x;P) is a competitive equilibrium (among
households) if (x;P) is a feasible allocation and
0. xh 2 EBh(p) for all h 2 P.
Thus in a competitive equilibrium (p;x;P), each household makes an e±cient
choice under its budget constraint and markets clear. Households play a dual
role: as collective decision making units and as competitive market partici-
pants. E±cient choice by the household refers to the individual consumption
and welfare of its members, not merely to the aggregate consumption bundle
of the household.
De¯nition 1 as it stands is also applicable in the case of an exogenously
given household structure P, as in Haller (2000). The de¯nition needs to
be amended to incorporate endogenous household formation and to achieve
the integration of three allocation mechanisms, each operating at a par-
ticular level of aggregation: Individual decisions are made to join or leave
households. Collective decisions within households determine the consump-
tion plans of household members. Competitive exchange across households
achieves a feasible allocation of resources.
In our static model, the amendments made to re°ect endogenous household
formation, the freedom of people to join or leave households, assume the form
of stability requirements. Speci¯c requirements are that at the going market
prices, no individual should bene¯t from exit; no consumer should bene¯t
from joining another household; no group of consumers should bene¯t from
forming a new household. The ¯rst two requirements combined constitute the
weak form of individual stability which is a prominent equilibrium concept
in the literature on hedonic coalitions; see, e.g., Drµ eze and Greenberg (1980).
8The last requirement that at the going market prices, no group of consumers
should bene¯t from forming a new household is the weak counter-part of
the stability concept prevalent in the matching literature; see, e.g., Gale and
Shapley (1962), Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
In Gersbach and Haller (2003), we consider competitive equilibria at which no
individual bene¯ts from exit and call such equilibria Competitive Equilibria
with Free Exit (CEFE). If in addition, no consumer can bene¯t from joining
another household, we call the corresponding equilibria Competitive Equi-
libria with Free Household Formation (CEFH). In that paper, we establish
existence of CEFE and study the welfare properties of CEFE. We address
existence of CEFH | which need not always exist | and investigate the
welfare implications of strengthening the stability requirement from CEFE
to CEFH. In Gersbach and Haller (2005) we observe that the most stringent
stability requirement, that in equilibrium no group of consumers can bene-
¯t from forming a new household has very strong welfare implications. In
particular, weak core inclusion obtains: if at a competitive equilibrium, no
group of consumers bene¯ts from forming a new household, then the corre-
sponding equilibrium allocation belongs to the weak core. For the sake of
completeness, we provide the short proof of the result.
Proposition 1 (Weak Core Inclusion)
Let (p;x;P) be a competitive equilibrium at which no group of consumers can
bene¯t from forming a new household. Then (x;P) belongs to the weak core.
proof. Let (p;x;P) be a competitive equilibrium at which no group bene-
¯ts from forming a new household. Suppose coalition J can strictly improve
upon the allocation (x;P) by means of a partition Q of J and household con-
sumption plans yh;h 2 Q. Now let h 2 Q. Then Ui(yh;h) > Ui(xP(i);P(i))
for all i 2 h. If h 2 P, then p ¤ yh > p!h, since xh 2 EBh(p). If h 62 P,
then p ¤ yh > p!h, since group h cannot bene¯t from forming a new house-










h2Q p ¤ yh >
P






h2Q !h. Hence no coali-
9tion J can strictly improve upon the allocation (x;P).
If one assumes in addition the budget exhaustion property and the redistri-
bution property of Gersbach and Haller (2001), then weak core inclusion can
be replaced by strong core inclusion, that is the assertion that no coalition
of consumers can weakly improve upon the allocation (x;P).
4 Clubs: Valuation Equilibrium
In accordance with the club literature, Absence of Consumption Externalities
(ACE) and Individual Property Rights (IPR) are assumed throughout this
section.
De¯nition 2 A state (p;x;P) is a valuation equilibrium if (x;P) is a
feasible allocation and there exist admission prices or valuations Vi(h) for
i 2 I; h 2 Hi, such that:
1.
P
i2h Vi(h) = 0 for h 2 P;
2.
P
i2h Vi(h) · 0 for h 2 H; h = 2 P;
3. pxi + Vi(P(i)) = p!i for i 2 I;
4. If i 2 I, h 2 Hi, yi 2 Xi with Ui(yi;h) > Ui(xi;P(i)),
then pyi + Vi(h) > p!i.
Lemma 1 Suppose (p;x;P) is a valuation equilibrium. Then there do not
exist a household g 2 H and consumption bundles yi 2 Xi for i 2 g such that
(yi)i2g 2 Bg(p) and Ui(yi;g) > Ui(xi;P(i)) for all i 2 g.
proof. Suppose (p;x;P) is a valuation equilibrium with admission prices
Vi(h) for i 2 I; h 2 Hi, and there exist a household g 2 H and consumption
bundles yi 2 Xi for i 2 g such that Ui(yi;g) > Ui(xi;P(i)) for all i 2 g.
10Then by equilibrium condition 4, pyi + Vi(g) > p!i for all i 2 g. Hence,




i2g p!i. Therefore, (yi)i2g = 2
Bg(p).
Proposition 2 Let each Ui be continuous and strictly monotone in xi 2 Xi.
Suppose (p;x;P) is a valuation equilibrium. Then:
(i) (p;x;P) is a competitive equilibrium at which no group of consumers
can bene¯t from forming a new household.
(ii) (x;P) is a strong core allocation.
proof. Let Ui; i 2 I, be as hypothesized.
(i) Suppose (p;x;P) is a valuation equilibrium. Then (x;P) is a feasible
allocation. If h 2 P and xh 62 EBh(p), then there exist j 2 h and zh 2 Bh(p)
with Uj(zj;h) > Uj(xj;h) and Ui(zi;h) ¸ Ui(z;h) for i 2 h; i 6= j. In case
h = fjg, set yj = zj. In case h 6= fjg, by the hypothesized continuity and
strict monotonicity of the utility functions, zj 6= 0 and there exists " 2 (0;1)
such that Uj((1¡")zj;h) > Uj(xj;h) and Ui(zi+("=[jhj¡1])zj;h) > Ui(xi) for
i 2 h;i 6= j. Set yj = (1¡")zj and yi = zi+("=[jhj¡1])zj for i 2 h;i 6= j. In
any case, h 2 P and xh 62 EBh(p) implies existence of consumption bundles
yi 2 Xi for i 2 h such that (yi)i2g 2 Bh(p) and Ui(yi;h) > Ui(xi;h) =
Ui(xi;P(i)) for all i 2 h, which contradicts the assertion of Lemma 1. Hence
xh 2 EBh(p) for h 2 P has to hold and (p;x;P) is a competitive equilibrium.
Application of Lemma 1 to h = 2 P yields that no group of consumers can
bene¯t from forming a new household.
(ii) By Theorem 3 of Gilles and Scotchmer (1997), a valuation equilibrium
allocation (x;P) is a strong core allocation. Hence the assertion.
11De¯nition 3 Let i 2 I and (xi;h) 2 Xi £ Hi. We say that consumer i
(a) has a group preference against (xi;h) if there exists g 2 Hi such
that
Ui(xi;h) < Ui(yi;g) (1)
for all yi 2 Xi.
(b) has a group preference for (xi;h) if there exists g 2 Hi such that
Ui(xi;h) > Ui(yi;g) (2)
for all yi 2 Xi. In case (2) holds for a particular g 2 Hi, we also say
that i prefers (xi;h) to g.
Proposition 3 Let each Ui be continuous and strictly monotone in xi 2 Xi.
Suppose (p;x;P) is a competitive equilibrium at which no group of consumers
can bene¯t from forming a new household and no individual i has a group
preference against (xi;P(i)). Then (p;x;P) is a valuation equilibrium and
(x;P) is a strong core allocation.
proof. Let Ui;i 2 I, and (p;x;P) be as hypothesized. Because of strong
monotonicity, p À 0. First we are going to de¯ne valuations Vi(h) for h 2
H;i 2 h. For h 2 P; i 2 h, set Vi(h) ´ p!i ¡ pxi. For h 62 P, let h¤ denote
the set of i 2 h who favor (xi;P(i)) to h. We distinguish two cases.








Case 2: h¤ = ;. Take i 2 I. There exist yi;zi 2 Xi such that
Ui(yi;h) · Ui(xi;P(i)) · Ui(zi;h); (3)
since i does not have a group preference against (xi;P(i)) and i does not
favor (xi;P(i)) to h. Now put
mi(h) ´ minfmijmaxfUi(zi;h) : zi 2 Xi;pzi · mig = Ui(xi;P(i))g: (4)
12Because of (3), p À 0, and continuity of Ui in its ¯rst argument, mi(h)
is well de¯ned. mi(h) is the smallest expenditure on i's consumption that
permits individual i to attain utility Ui(xi;P(i)) as member of household h.
Set Vi(h) ´ p!i ¡ mi(h).
Next we show that with these valuations Vi(h) for h 2 H;i 2 h, (p;x;P) is
a valuation equilibrium.
Condition 1:




i2h(p!i ¡ pxi) = p
P





i2h !i = !h. Because of strict monotonicity, xh 2 EBh(p) implies
p
P
i2h xi = p!h. Hence
P
i2h Vi(h) = p!h ¡ p
P
i2h xi = 0 as asserted.
Condition 2:












· ¡jh¤j < 0; hence the assertion.
² For h 2 H;h 62 P;h¤ = ;, suppose that
P
i2h mi(h) < p!h. Then set
d(h) ´ p!h¡
P
i2h mi(h). For each i 2 h, choose yi 2 argmaxfUi(zi;h) :










i2h mi(h) = p!h, that is yh = (yi)i2h belongs to Bh(p). Conse-
quently, the consumers in h can bene¯t from forming the new house-
hold h | and choosing yh 2 Bh(p). This contradicts the hypothesis
that in the competitive equilibrium (p;x;P), no group of consumers
can bene¯t from forming a new household. Hence, to the contrary,
P




i2h(p!i ¡ mi(h)) =
p!h ¡
P
i2h mi(h) · 0 as asserted.
Condition 3: Since Vi(h) ´ p!i ¡ pxi for h 2 P; i 2 h, it follows pxi +
Vi(P(i)) = p!i for i 2 I as asserted.
Condition 4: Let i 2 I, h 2 Hi, yi 2 Xi with Ui(yi;h) > Ui(xi;P(i)). We
have to show that pyi + Vi(h) > p!i.
13² In the case h = P(i), pyi+Vi(h) · p!i implies pyi+p!i¡pxi · p!i and,
consequently, pyi · pxi, which together with Ui(yi;P(i)) > Ui(xi;P(i))
contradicts xh 2 EBh(p). Therefore, pyi + Vi(h) > p!i has to hold.
² In the case h 62 P;h¤ 6= ;, the inequality Ui(yi;h) > Ui(xi;P(i)) implies
i 2 h n h¤ and, consequently, pyi + Vi(h) = pyi + 1 + p!j > p!i.
² In the case h 62 P;h¤ = ;, the inequality Ui(yi;h) > Ui(xi;P(i)) implies
pyi > mi(h) and pyi + Vi(h) > mi(h) + Vi(h) = mi(h) + p!i ¡ mi(h) =
p!i. Thus pyi + Vi(h) > p!i holds in all cases.
This completes the proof that (p;x;P) is a valuation equilibrium. (x;P) is
a strong core allocation by Proposition 2 (ii).
Remark. Without the hypothesis that \no individual i has a group pref-
erence against (xi;P(i))", the conclusion need not hold. Namely, consider
I = f1;2g, ` = 1, and utility functions Ui(xi;fig) = xi; U1(x1;f1;2g) =
2 + x1; U2(x2;f1;2g) = ¡1 + x2. The endowments are !1 = !2 = 1. Then
x1 = x2 = 1, p = 1, P = ff1g;f2gg constitute a competitive equilibrium
where consumer 2 cannot bene¯t from formation of household h = f1;2g.
Moreover, consumer 1 has a group preference against (f1g;1). In particu-
lar, U1(0;f1;2g) > U1(1;f1g). Hence valuations supporting (p;x;P) as a
valuation equilibrium would have to satisfy V1(f1;2g) > 1, by equilibrium
condition 4. Consequently, U2(!2 + V1(f1;2g);f1;2g) > U2(x2;f2g). Hence
equilibrium condition 4 would require p(!2 + V1(f1;2g)) + V2(f1;2g) > p!2
or, since p = 1, V1(f1;2g) + V2(f1;2g) > 0, a violation of equilibrium con-
dition 2. In other words: To prevent both consumers from choosing house-
hold f1;2g over their respective households in P, the valuations (admission
prices) Vi(f1;2g) would have to be so high that f1;2g becomes a pro¯table
club. Thus, (p;x;P) cannot be a valuation equilibrium.
Notice that essentiality in the sense of Mas-Collel (1990) rules out that
a consumer i has group preferences for or against any (xi;h) 2 Xi £ Hi.
14Therefore, our example violates essentiality. It also violates the property
Ui(!i;fig) > Ui(0;h) for all i 2 I;h 2 Hi
which corresponds to the property that \endowments are large relative to
the value of club goods" in Gilles and Scotchmer (1997).
5 Consumption Externalities
The club literature, as a rule, assumes that preferences are sel¯sh, or in our
terminology, that consumption externalities are absent (ACE). In contrast,
our general model of households allows for the possibility that individuals
care about the composition and the consumption of each member of the
household to which they belong.
Propositions 2 and 3 imply that in the absence of consumption externalities,
the household model and the club model are essentially equivalent: Com-
petitive equilibria where no group of consumers bene¯ts from forming a new
household and valuation equilibria coincide. In addition, the corresponding
equilibrium allocations are strong core allocations. The equivalence breaks
down in the presence of consumption externalities. In the example of sub-
section 5.1 below, a valuation equilibrium allocation which is weakly Pareto-
optimal does not exist. However, there exists a competitive equilibrium where
no group of consumers can bene¯t from forming a new household and the
equilibrium allocation constitutes a strong Pareto-optimum. The equivalence
also breaks down in the opposite direction: In Gersbach and Haller (2001,
pp. 361-362), we present an example of a valuation equilibrium that fails to
be weakly Pareto-optimal and to be a competitive equilibrium among house-
holds. That example also demonstrates that in the presence of consumption
externalities, valuation equilibrium allocations may no longer belong to the
strong core | and need not even belong to the weak core. The Cobb-Douglas
preferences in the 2001 example can be replaced by homothetic and strictly
monotone preferences.
15Any extension of the concept of a valuation equilibrium to instances with
arbitrary household-speci¯c preferences should replace equilibrium condition
4 with a condition which implies the following:
5a. If i 2 I, yi 2 Xi with Ui((yi;(xj)j2P(i);j6=i);P(i)) > Ui(xP(i);P(i)),
then pyi + Vi(P(i)) > p!i.
5b. If i 2 I, yi 2 Xi with Ui(yi;fig) > Ui(xP(i);P(i)),
then pyi + Vi(fig) > p!i.
Condition 5a stipulates that ceteris paribus, a consumer cannot a®ord an
alternative individual consumption plan that makes him better o®. Condi-
tion 5b stipulates that a consumer cannot a®ord to go single and choose a
consumption bundle so that she is better o®. The subsequent example only
utilizes equilibrium conditions 1,2,3,5a and 5b and, therefore, applies to any
conceivable generalization of the valuation equilibrium concept.
5.1 Example
Let I = f1;2g, ` = 2, !1 = !2 = (4;1);!f1;2g = !1 + !2 = (8;2). A con-
sumption bundle for individual i is denoted (xi;yi) within the example. The
speci¯c utility representations are
Ui((xi;yi);fig) = xiyi for (xi;yi) 2 Xi, i=1,2;
U1((x1;y1);(x2;y2));f1;2g) = Ax1y1
for ((x1;y1);(x2;y2)) 2 X1 £ X2;
U2((x1;y1);(x2;y2));f1;2g) = Bx2y2 ¢ (1 + x1)¡1
for ((x1;y1);(x2;y2)) 2 X1 £ X2,
with A > 3;B > 9. Further put for ((x1;y1);(x2;y2)) 2 X1 £ X2:
W((x1;y1);(x2;y2)) ´ U1(((x1;y1);(x2;y2));f1;2g)¢U2(((x1;y1);(x2;y2));f1;2g).
16Then lnW = lnA + lnB + lnx1 + lny1 + lnx2 + lny2 ¡ ln(1 + x1).
Now consider the state (b p; b x; b P) given by the price system b p = (b p1; b p2) =
(1;6), the commodity allocation b x = ((b x1; b y1);(b x2; b y2)) = ((2;1);(6;1)), and
the household structure b P = fIg = ff1;2gg.
claim 1. The state (b p; b x; b P) is a competitive equilibrium at which no group
of consumers can bene¯t from forming a new household.
First observe that b x = b xI is the unique solution of the problem
max W(zI) subject to zI 2 BI(b p);
which implies b x = b xI 2 EBI(b p). Second, (b x; b P) is a feasible allocation. Hence
(b p; b x; b P) is a competitive equilibrium. Further, the equilibrium utilities are
U1(b x;I) = 2A;U2(b x;I) = 2B whereas maxfUj(zj;fjg)jzj 2 Bfjg(b p)g = 25=6
for j = 1;2. Since A > 3;B > 9 and h = f1g;f2g are the only potential
new households, this implies that no group of consumers can bene¯t from
forming a new household.
claim 2. The allocation (b x; b P) is a strong Pareto optimum.





want to show that (x0;P 0) does not weakly dominate the allocation (b x; b P).




0; b P) for i = 1;2:
The latter holds trivially true for P 0 = fIg = b P. It holds true for P 0 =
ff1g;f2gg, because A > 3, B > 9, and feasibility of x0 implies x0
1 · 8. It
remains to show that (x0; b P) does not weakly dominate the allocation (b x; b P).
Since (x0; b P) is feasible and !b P = !I, one obtains x0 2 BI(b p). Since b x is
the unique maximizer of W on BI(b p), with W(b x) > 0, (x0; b P) cannot weakly
dominate (b x; b P).
17claim 3. If (p¤;x¤;P ¤) is a valuation equilibrium, then (x¤;P ¤) fails to
be weakly Pareto-optimal.
Let (p¤;x¤;P ¤) be a valuation equilibrium which is supported by valuations
V1(f1g);V1(f1;2g);V2(f2g);V2(f1;2g). We will show that (x¤;P ¤) cannot be
weakly Pareto-optimal. By equilibrium conditions 1 and 2, Vi(fig) · 0 for
i = 1;2. If for some consumer i, Ui(x¤
P¤(i);P ¤(i)) = 0, then
Ui(!i;fig) > Ui(x¤
P¤(i);P ¤(i)) while p!i + Vi(fig) · p!i, contradicting equi-
librium condition 5b. Hence Ui(x¤
P¤(i);P ¤(i)) > 0 for i = 1;2. Consequently,
(x¤
i;y¤
i) À 0 for i = 1;2.




¤; b P) for i = 1;2:
These inequalities follow from (x¤
i;y¤
i) À 0 for i = 1;2, A > 3, x¤
1 < 8, B > 9.
If P ¤ = b P, then (x¤
i;y¤
i) À 0 for i = 1;2, the separable form of the
consumption externality, and equilibrium conditions 3 and 5a require that
each (x¤
i;y¤
i) solves the problem
max xiyi subject to (xi;yi) 2 Xi; p
¤¢(xi;yi) + Vi(f1;2g) · p
¤!i
and further that p¤ = ¸ ¢ (1;4), (x¤
1;y¤
1) = ¹1 ¢ (8;2), (x¤
2;y¤
2) = ¹2 ¢ (8;2)
for some ¸ > 0;¹1 > 0;¹2 > 0. But then the gradients of U1(¢; I) and
U2(¢; I) with respect to z 2 XI = X di®er at x¤
I = x¤ À 0. Therefore,
a strict Pareto-improvement is possible by means of a slight change of the
commodity allocation, which shows that (x¤;P ¤) = (x¤; b P)) is not weakly
Pareto-optimal in this case either. This completes the analysis of the exam-
ple.
Remark. One can replace the Cobb-Douglas terms xiyi in the example
by strictly monotonic functions. This however, would render the numerical
representation and analysis much more tedious.
185.2 Restrictions on Private Consumption in Clubs
Many clubs have statutes which lay out a governance structure and regulate
the conduct of their members to some degree. For instance, club rules may
stipulate that members participate in certain events and rituals, contribute
labor, provide personal equipment, dress appropriately, or follow dietary re-
strictions.
Clubs may have good reasons to restrict the consumption possibilities of their
members. By imposing individual lower or upper bounds on the consumption
of certain goods, the club may be capable of internalizing consumption exter-
nalities | provided its members are not lured away by less restrictive clubs.
In the foregoing example, consumer 1 in household I = f1;2g will choose
(b x1; b y1) when restricted to x1 · 2 and given income b p¢(b x1; b y1) to spend on
own consumption. But of course, consumer 1 would prefer a situation with
the same individual budget and no restrictions. Therefore, the observation
that a suitable restriction can induce the consumer to make a particular
choice is only interesting if such a club persists in a valuation equilibrium
of a model where alternative clubs, with less severe or no restrictions, are
admissible. Accordingly, for ° 2 I R+ [ f1g, let < f1;2g;° >=< I;° >
denote the club consisting of members 1 and 2 that imposes the restriction
x1 · ° on consumer 1.
claim 4. (b p; b x;f< f1;2g;2 >g) is a valuation equilibrium in a model where
all clubs, f1g;f2g and < f1;2g;° >; ° 2 I R+ [ f1g, are admissible.
The proof is given in the appendix. The claim indicates how certain con-
sumption externalities can be internalized in a carefully chosen extension of
the club model. Scotchmer (2005) examines an illustrative example of pur-
chase clubs where local public goods are privately provided by club members
and the individual contributions of such goods at proprietary prices are mod-
eled as membership characteristics. To what extent suitably modi¯ed club
models have the capacity to internalize arbitrary consumption externalities
remains an open question which we leave for future research.
196 Final Remarks
For the sake of direct comparison, we have assumed common primitive data
for the household and the club model and drawn the distinction in terms
of the equilibrium concepts. One of the primitive concepts are households
de¯ned as coalitions of named individuals where in principle, each individ-
ual can be its own type, that is, everybody is special. Accordingly, in our
de¯nition, valuations are individualized: Identical individuals in identical
households can be charged di®erent admission fees. In contrast, club pro-
¯les in the literature specify the number of each member type so that in
principle, everybody is replaceable, and valuations are anonymous. If in a
type or replica economy, a valuation equilibrium is supported by anonymous
valuations, then the conclusion of Proposition 2 still holds. Conversely, un-
der the hypothesis of Proposition 3, equal treatment (in terms of utility)
of identical individuals in identical households must hold in the competitive
equilibrium at hand. Consequently, the valuations constructed in the proof
satisfy anonymity. Therefore, the conclusion of the proposition also holds
when valuations are required to be anonymous.
Our de¯nition of a household or club h presumes that this group is feasible
within the existing population I, that is h µ I. The club literature is divided
between authors who allow memberships in infeasible clubs as hypothetical
alternatives and those who consider only feasible alternatives. The ¯rst ver-
sion amounts to a more demanding de¯nition of equilibrium. The argument
in its favor is based on an analogy to consumer sovereignty in conventional
pure exchange economies: The consumer is free to choose any consump-
tion bundle from the budget set, regardless of whether or not this choice is
compatible with the resources available in the economy. In analogy, the con-
sumer should feel free to select any a®ordable hypothetical club regardless
of whether such a club can be formed within the existing population. The
counter-argument is that markets are not necessarily complete: In certain
economies certain commodities or commodity bundles are not available or
not tradeable, and not priced in the market. The same applies to infeasible
20clubs. Proposition 2 still holds if one applies the more demanding de¯nition
in the club model, with a consistent extension of preferences. Propositions
2 and 3 continue to hold, if infeasible groups are considered both in the
household and the club model.
In our previous work on household formation, we rarely consider the most
stringent version of a competitive equilibrium, which requires that no group
of consumers can bene¯t from forming a new household. The conclusion of
Proposition 2 continues to hold if the weaker equilibrium concepts, CEFE
and CEFH, are employed. In Proposition 3, however, the hypothesis of a
competitive equilibrium in which a group of consumers can bene¯t from
forming a new household cannot be replaced by the weaker conditions CEFE
or CEFH.
The formal analysis of the present paper assumes individual property rights
(IPR) as does most of the club literature. Haller (2000) and Gersbach and
Haller (2001) do not rely on this assumption. A violation of IPR can repre-
sent, for example, a reduced form of household production.
7 Appendix
proof of claim 4: preliminaries. At price system b p, household I has
aggregate income b p!I = 20. Let Â 2 [0;1] denote consumer 1's expenditure
share in household I so that at the price system b p, m1 = m1(Â) = 20Â is
spent on consumption of member 1 and m2 = m2(Â) = 20(1 ¡ Â) is spent
on consumption of member 2. Speci¯cally at state (b p; b x; b P), the amount
m1 = b p¢(b x1; b y1) = 8 is spent on consumption of member 1 and, therefore,
Â = b Â = 0:4.
For any Â = [0;1] and i = 1;2, let (xi(Â);yi(Â)) denote the solution of the
problem
max xiyi subject to (xi;yi) 2 Xi; b p ¢(xi;yi) · mi(Â):
For Â0 ´
p
12=10, U1(xI(Â0);I) = U1(b xI;I) = 2A and x1(Â0) = 10Â0 =
p
12.
21Further note that the solutions of the quadratic equation °(20 ¡ °) = 12 or
°2¡20°+12 = 0 are e °1 = 10¡
p
88 and e °2 = 10+
p
88. Then °(20¡°)=6 ¸ 2
if and only if ° 2 [e °1; e °2].
valuations. Now we are ready to specify valuations which support (b p; b x;f<
f1;2g;2 >g) as a valuation equilibrium. Let us set Vi(fig) = 0 for i = 1;2.
For \clubs" of the form < f1;2g;° >, we distinguish three cases.
Case 1: ° ¸ x1(Â0). We provide consumer 1 with income m1(Â0) = 20Â0 =
2
p
12 available for consumption, by setting V1(< I;° >) = b p!1 ¡ m1(Â0) =
10 ¡ 2
p
12, V2(< I;° >) = ¡V1(< I;° >).
Case 2: e °1 · ° < x1(Â0). If consumer 1 has income m1(Â0) = 20Â0 = 2
p
12
available for consumption, then his ideal choice (x1(Â0);y1(Â0)) is no longer
available. He will choose x1 = °, y1 = (m1(Â0) ¡ °)=6 and achieve utility
Ax1y1 = A°(m1(Â0) ¡ °)=6 < 2A. He attains the utility level 2A only if he
has an income m1 > m1(Â0) | which yields maximal utility A°(m1 ¡ °)=6.
Since x1(Â0) < e °2, ° 2 [e °1; e °2]. Hence A°(20 ¡ °)=6 ¸ 2A. Therefore,
there exists a unique m
°
i 2 [m1(Â0);20] such that A°(m
°
1 ¡ °)=6 = 2A. We
provide consumer 1 with income m
°
1 available for consumption, by setting
V1(< I;° >) = b p!1 ¡ m
°
1, V2(< I;° >) = ¡V1(< I;° >).
Case 3: ° < e °1. Put V1(< I;° >) = ¡10 and
V2(< I;° >) = ¡V1(< I;° >) = 10 = b p!2.
verification of equilibrium conditions. Next we show that with these
valuations, (b p; b x;f< f1;2g;2 >g) is a valuation equilibrium.
Conditions 1 and 2: V2(< I;° >) = ¡V1(< I;° >) for all ° 2 I R+ [ f1g
and Vi(fig) = 0 for i = 1;2 yield the assertion.
Condition 3: For ° = 2, e °1 · ° < x1(Â0). First consider i = 1. Under
the constraint x1 · 2, b p¢(b x1; b y1) = 8 is exactly the minimum amount that
22consumer 1 needs to spend on consumption to attain utility level 2A. Hence
m
°
1 = b p¢(b x1; b y1). Since V1(< I;° >) = b p!1 ¡ m
°
1 in case 2, the required
condition follows:
V1(< I;° >) + b p¢(b x1; b y1) = V1(< I;° >) + m
°
1 = b p!1: (5)
Second, consider i = 2. Since V1(< I;° >)+V2(< I;° >) = 0 and (b x1; b y1)+
(b x2; b y2) = !b P = !1 + !2, the required condition is implied by (5):
V2(< I;° >) + b p¢(b x2; b y2)
= V1(< I;° >) + V2(< I;° >) + b p¢(b x1; b y1) + b p¢(b x2; b y2)
¡ [V1(< I;° >) + b p¢(b x1; b y1)]
= b p!1 + b p!2 ¡ b p!1
= b p!2:
9
> > > > > > =
> > > > > > ;
(6)
Condition 4: If i 2 I, h = fig, and zi 2 Xi with Ui(zi;h) > Ui(b x;I), then
b pzi + Vi(h) = b pzi > b p!i, since Vi(h) = 0 and group h cannot bene¯t from
forming a new household.
If h = I and ° 2 I R+ [ f1g, consider the club < I;° >. In cases 1 and 2,
consumer 1 achieves utility level U1(b x;I) = 2A when he spends the amount
b p!1 ¡ V1(< I;° >) optimally on his own consumption. To achieve a higher
utility level, he would have to consume z1 2 X1 such that b pz1 > b p!1 ¡ V1(<
I;° >) and, hence, b pz1 + V1(< I;° >) > [b p!1 ¡ V1(< I;° >)] + V1(<
I;° >) = b p!1. Under the premise that consumer 1 spends the amount
b p!1 ¡ V1(< I;° >) optimally on his consumption and achieves utility level
2A, consumer 2 can achieve at most utility level 2B when she spends the
amount
b p!2 ¡ V2(< I;° >) optimally on her consumption. This follows from b p!1 ¡
V1(< I;° >)+ b p!2 ¡V2(< I;° >) = b p!I, U1(b x;I) = 2A, U2(b x;I) = 2B, and
b xI 2 EBI(b p). To achieve ceteris paribus a utility level greater than 2B, she
would have to consume z2 2 X2 such that b pz2 > b p!2 ¡ V2(< I;° >) and,
consequently, b pz2+V2(< I;° >) > [b p!2¡V2(< I;° >)]+V2(< I;° >) = b p!2.
In case 3, consumer 1 cannot reach the utility level 2A when he spends
b p!1 ¡V1(< I;° >) = 20, the entire household income, on own consumption.
23To exceed the utility level 2A, consumer 1 would have to consume z1 2 X1
such that b pz1 > b p!1 ¡ V1(< I;° >) and, hence,
b pz1 + V1(< I;° >) > [b p!1 ¡ V1(< I;° >)] + V1(< I;° >) = b p!1.
Consumer 2 attains zero utility when she spends b p!2 ¡ V2(< I;° >) = 0 on
own consumption. To exceed the utility level 2B, she would have to consume
z2 2 X2 such that b pz2 > b p!2 ¡ V2(< I;° >) and, consequently,
b pz2 + V2(< I;° >) > [b p!2 ¡ V2(< I;° >)] + V2(< I;° >) = b p!2.
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